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The objective of this work is to study whether the possibility of a downgrade or 
upgrade of a firm’s credit rating has any significant impact in its capital structure 
choice. The base of this study is Kisgen’s CR-CS Theory, presented in the 2006 paper 
entitled “Credit Ratings and Capital Structure”, which focuses on USA firms while I 
will consider European firms that constitute the indexes of some selected countries.  
 
Credit ratings have gained an increasingly relevant role in the past decades. In 
financial markets their importance has been acknowledged since their beginning in 
the 19th century, as the primary objective of credit ratings is to decrease information 
asymmetry by providing the issuer’s creditworthiness to the investors. A credit rating 
agency publishes its opinion concerning the bond’s quality or intrinsic value, i.e. if 
the issuer is able and willing to fully meet its financial obligations on time, so that 
investors have another factor to take into account when making an investment 
decision. It is important to emphasize that credit ratings are not intended to be 
investment recommendations and are not an absolute measure of risk; they simply 
reflect a relative opinion about it (strongest to weakest). 
 
The first rating books were published in the second half of the 19th century, in 
New York, by mercantile credit agencies, showing the merchants’ ability to pay their 
financial obligations. These agencies were rating businesses. In the beginning of the 
20th century, the first securities’ ratings were published, induced by the massive 
construction of railroads in the USA. John Moody, an US financial analyst and 
investor, started to rate these railroad bonds in 1909. Some years later, other 
companies were formed and provided ratings books as well: Poor’s Publishing 
Company in 1916, Standard Statistics Company in 1922, Fitch Publishing Company 
in 1924. In 1941, Standard Statistics and Poor’s Publishing merged forming the well-
known Standard and Poor’s Company. Credit rating agencies started to sell ratings 
books directly to investors – “investor pays” or subscription model1. In 1934, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created in order to increase trust in 
                                                
1 The “investor pays” model is a model where the investors pay a subscription to have 
access to the ratings released by the agencies. 
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financial markets. This trust was to be established trough the standardization of 
financial statements. In the same decade, bank regulators set a decree prohibiting the 
investment in bonds that did not have an investment grade. Thereby banks were 
forced to rely only on ratings from recognized rating manuals. The insurance and 
federal pension regulators adopted similar rules in the following decades.  
 
In the 1970s, the SEC recognized as “official” the rating manuals of S&P, Fitch 
and Moody’s, as they were designated as “Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings 
Organizations” (NRSRO). In this same decade, due to a number of factors, the 
payment model of the ratings business turned into an “issuer pays” model. This arose 
a possible conflict of interest; for instance, credit rating agencies could be tempted to 
rate upwards in order to keep their clients. On the other hand, credit rating agencies 
had to defend their long-term reputations, so as to not lose all credibility and, 
consequently, their clients. The possible conflicts of interest surrounding this topic 
have been discussed since then. 
 
The first reputational blow for the credit rating agencies took place in 2001, with 
the bankruptcy on Enron. The three major NRSRO failed to update the firm’s rating 
in a timely manner – five days before the bankruptcy was announced, Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch still rated Enron’s bonds as “investment grade”. The controversies 
surrounding the credit rating industry became even wider with the beginning of the 
subprime crisis in 2008. The role of credit rating agencies was highly criticized as 
defaults started to be observed in securities that were initially rated with a AAA score 
(more specifically, mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations). 
These securities had much more complexity than the credit rating agencies were used 
to, so they became involved in the securities design. Additionally, there were not 
many issuers of these types of securities, but they had high issuance volumes. This, 
perhaps, increased the pressure on credit rating agencies to be more optimistic in their 
assessments. By that time the issuers had the power to “go shopping” for ratings. A 
financial crisis burst when these securities lost most of their value. The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report, submitted by The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on 
January 2011, reported: 
“We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the 
wheel of financial destruction. The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of 
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the financial meltdown. The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could 
not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors relied on 
them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use them, or regulatory 
capital standards were hinged on them. This crisis could not have happened without 
the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades 
through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms.” 
 
In Europe, more specifically in the Euro Area, the financial crisis evolved to a 
banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, and a growth and competitiveness crisis 
altogether. Every update of a sovereign rating has impact on the ratings of firms in 
that country.  
 
For this reason it is timely to study the impact of a change in rating in the 
financing choices of Euro Area firms. This is what this dissertation does:  I examine 
the relationship between changes in the rating of a sample of listed European firms 
and the changes in those firms’ capital structure. 
Although credit rating agencies played their role in the crisis, credit ratings 
continue to play a very important role in financial markets and many studies have 
been developed concerning this subject. Kisgen (2006) makes a series of empirical 
tests to prove that credit ratings are a concern to managers when they are deciding the 
firm’s capital structure – the Credit Ratings and Capital Structure hypothesis. The 
sample used by Kisgen only considered firms from the USA and a pre-crisis period. 
He was able to show that the Credit Rating – Capital Structure Hypothesis applies. 
This work will build on Kisgen’s 2006 study in the context of Euro Area, rather than 
the USA. For this effect I will consider firms of some Euro Area indexes (Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, France and Germany). The objective is to test if this hypothesis 
is also valid for the European context. I find that Portuguese firms tend to issue more 
net debt relative to equity when near a broad rating2 change:  approximately 1%, 
including financial institutions in the sample;  approximately 2% and 5% for the time 
periods 1996-2011 and 1996-2006, respectively, excluding financial institutions. 
Italian firms, including financial institutions, tend to issue approximately 3% more net 
                                                
2As defined in Kisgen (2006), “Broad Ratings” are ratings levels including the minus, middle, 
and plus specifications for a particular rating (i.e., a Broad Rating of BBB refers to ratings of 
BBB+, BBB, and BBB−). 
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debt relative to equity when near a broad rating change. As regards the other countries 
considered in this study, no statistically significant relationship was identified. 
 
  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Section 2., a revision 
of the main capital structure theories is presented, together with some references 
regarding credit ratings. Section 3. describes the sample and methodology. 
Additionally, some descriptive statistics are presented in this section. The tests and 
results are described in Section 4., Section 5. presents additional analysis and 
robustness checks and Section 6. concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
The capital structure choice is one of the central topics in finance and has been 
studied for decades. Many different theoretical models have been proposed as well as 
empirically tested, relating capital structure choices to a variety of possible 
determinants. This work focuses on one  in particular – credit rating. Therefore, 
we now review the most important findings in this field, starting with more 
“standard” capital structure literature, and focusing next on its relation with credit 
ratings. 
 
2.1 Capital Structure: a review 
 
Modigliani and Miller, in their 1958 seminal paper, presented the irrelevance 
theorem (Proposition I), which states that the capital structure choice of a firm does 
not influence its total value, when considering perfect capital markets. This theorem is 
acknowledged as the beginning of Modern Capital Structure Theory, assuming perfect 
capital markets and imposing various constraints - very far from the real world, which 
is full of imperfections. Therefore authors started to analyze the consequences of 




The effects related to corporate income tax were addressed already in the above-
mentioned paper, but in 1963 Modigliani and Miller published a correction, in which 
they showed that there is a tax advantage of debt financing. Consequently, when 
taking this imperfection into account, the capital structure choice is no longer 
irrelevant, as holding debt adds value to the firm. The authors pointed out the fact that 
this result does not imply that firms should use all the debt possible without taking 
into consideration other relevant factors, such as personal taxes and different kinds of 
costs. The discussion around the impact of these costs followed naturally, leading to 
what is often cited as the Static Tradeoff Theory of Capital Structure. 
 
The Static Tradeoff Theory states that firms balance the benefits and costs of 
holding debt in order to determine a target debt-to-value ratio (which maximizes the 
firm’s total value, i.e. leads to the optimal capital structure) and will then move 
gradually towards this ratio. The main issue is how to measure these costs and 
benefits.  
Starting with the benefits of debt, in Modigliani and Miller (1963) only the 
marginal tax rate was considered – the gain is positively related to the tax rate. Other 
authors defended that, in order to be more accurate when valuing the benefits of debt, 
the effective marginal tax rate must be taken into account. In this way not only the 
corporate income taxes are considered, but also the personal income taxes paid by 
debt holders and equity holders. Miller (1977) showed that personal taxes on 
equityholders and debtholders may offset the savings generated by corporate taxes. 
Compromise theories between the extremes have also been proposed. Regarding the 
costs of holding debt, these are essentially financial distress costs, which include not 
only all the costs related to the event of bankruptcy, but also the agency costs 
associated with a default or even the probability of a default (so the value that would 
be lost in a default event must also be taken into account). An example of such an 
agency cost of debt would be the tendency for gambling, with asset substitution 
towards riskier assets in highly levered firms. Besides the favorable corporate tax 
treatment to debt, another advantage of this source of capital would be the so-called 
agency benefits of debt. An example of this would be debt playing a disciplinary role 





The Tradeoff Theory constitutes one of the main capital structure theories, 
although other authors have viewed the capital structure decision from different 
perspectives. One of the best known such theories is the Pecking Order Theory, which 
was first presented by Donaldson (1961), but only gained true recognition after the 
modifications proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
 
The Pecking Order Theory’s main implication is that firms choose to finance their 
projects preferably with internally generated funds, which has wide empirical support. 
According to this theory, if external funds are required, firms will prefer to issue 
secured debt first (default-free debt), followed by hybrid securities. The firm will only 
issue equity as a last resort. The reasoning for this order of choice was based on costs. 
Using internal funds only involves transaction costs, whereas new debt and equity 
require issuance costs that are higher than the transaction ones. Additionally, issuing 
equity would require higher costs than issuing low risk debt (and furthermore debt 
also contributes positively when taking into account its tax advantages), due to 
asymmetric information. In Myers and Majluf (1984), a signaling problem was 
introduced, inspired in the adverse selection argument proposed by Akerlof (1970). 
Assuming that managers have privileged information regarding the firm, they will 
avoid issuing equity when they know that the share price is undervalued. Investors are 
aware of this fact so, if a firm issues equity it is giving signs to the market that the 
share price should be lower. As regards the issuance of debt to moderate levels, the 
firm is signaling the market that its position is comfortable to the point that having 
debt is not a problem. 
 
The main implication of this theory is that firms are highly dependable on the 
funds they generate. If the investments they have to make require more funds than 
those generated by the firm, then debt will be the first option to finance the needed 
investments. Consequently, debt levels will increase when the firm’s investment 
needs exceed the funds it generates and will decrease when the internally generated 
funds are sufficient to cover all the investments required. The Pecking Order Theory 
implies that a firm’s debt will have a short-term response to sudden variations in 




Both theories, tradeoff and pecking order, try to explain the capital structure 
choice through a set of factors. Which factors are really relevant in a firm’s funding 
choice is one key aspect for the topic. There are many papers that tackle this issue: 
what are the determinants of capital structure choice? The identification of these 
determinants may not be the most challenging part of the process, as many of them 
have an intuitive understanding. Many factors are difficult to define in an econometric 
model, so proxies must be used. If these proxy indicators are not constructed carefully 
then the results might turn out skewed. These determinants are i) the tax benefits, ii) 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs and iii) information asymmetry. Different 
empirical studies3 address the relevance of the referred determinants, using a variety 
of measure indicators such as size, profitability, growth, industry classification, etc. 
These studies do not lead to the same unique conclusion as regards which capital 
structure theory is the most adaptable to the real world. That is, there is not yet a 
theory that explains fully the capital structure decisions of all firms. 
 
2.2 Credit Ratings and Capital Structure (CR-CS) 
 
A different perspective from the two theories already mentioned was the one 
presented by Kisgen (2006), which leads to this dissertation’s primary focus – credit 
ratings as a relevant capital structure choice determinant.  
 
The main idea in this line of research is that each rating level leads to different 
costs or benefits, so the rating of the firm, as well as its possible downgrade or 
upgrade, should not be neglected when deciding on the type of financing. This fact 
implies that the amount of debt held by a firm holds a discontinuous relationship with 
its total value. The main implication of this argument is that a firm will tend to issue 
less net debt, relative to net equity, when its rating is near a change,  and not only 
when it is near a downgrade, but also when it is near an upgrade. In comparison with 
the abovementioned more traditional capital structure theories, the main 
differences/adjustments to be considered are as follows. 
                                                
3 E.g. Titman and Wessels (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Harris and Raviv 





The Tradeoff theory states that the costs and benefits of debt will be balanced 
until the firm reaches its maximum value. The CR-CS hypothesis implies that the firm 
will also balance these costs and benefits but, additionally, it will take into account 
the different levels of credit ratings. If a certain level of debt maximizes the firm 
value when taking into account the costs and benefits implied by the tradeoff theory, 
but on the other hand causes a deterioration of the credit rating, then the firm may 
choose a capital structure different from the tradeoff theory optimum. This way the 
firm will avoid additional costs related to a change in rating that were not being 
considered in the tradeoff theory. 
  
From a different perspective, the pecking order theory states that the firm will 
decide to issue debt before equity. When considering a possible rating change, firms 
will not issue debt without taking into account the costs that a lower rating will 
involve. This means that, sometimes, firms may choose to issue equity before debt, so 
that they can avoid the costs originated by a rating downgrade, which is contrary to 
the main implications of the pecking order theory. This is also valid for firms with a 
middle credit rating that are considering large offerings of debt. 
 
Kisgen (2007) has further developed this line of thought, as well as other authors, 
such as Michelsen and Klein (2011) who used rating outlooks to measure possible 
changes in the respective rating of a firm. Their results support the conclusion in 
Kisgen (2006) – firms near a rating change will issue less debt when compared with 
firms not near a rating change. Additionally, as they considered firms from Europe 
and the middle East and Africa besides the USA, they concluded that the effect is 
larger for US firms. These empirical studies focus on U.S. or worldwide data. So this 
dissertation will focus on the Euro Area only, in order to assess the response of these 
firms to a credit rating change and then compare with the US and worldwide results. 
Does a credit rating change influence Euro Area firms as much as in the USA, and in 
the same direction?  This study is even more relevant in the presence of the recent 




In the remainder of this dissertation I aim to shed some light on this timely topic, 









The main capital structure variables I choose are: 
 
· Dit = total debt (Datastream item WC03255)4. 
· DDit = total debt t minus total debt t-1for firm i. 
· Eit = common equity (Datastream item WC03501)5. 
· DEit = common equity t minus common equity t-1 for firm i. 
· Ait = total assets (Datastream item WC02999)6. 
· NetDIssit = (DDit - DEit)/Ait. 
 
NetDIssit is the dependent variable of the regressions that constitute the model, 
which are described in the following section (4. Methodology). This variable will 
allow to measure a firm’s actions (whether it issues debt or equity) when taking into 
account the beginning of year credit rating. 
                                                
4 As defined in Thomson Financial – Worldscope Database Datatype Definitions Guide (April 2006): 
for all Industries, total debt represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. It is the sum 
of long and short term debt. 
5 As defined in Thomson Financial - Datastream Global Equity Indices – Additional Index and Security 
Valuation Datatypes ( March 2008): common equity represents common shareholders' investment in a 
company. 
6 As defined in Thomson Financial - Datastream Global Equity Indices – Additional Index and Security 
Valuation Datatypes ( March 2008):  for all Industries, total assets represent the sum of total current 
assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
property plant and equipment and other assets; for Banks, total assets represent the sum of cash & due 
from banks, total investments, net loans, customer liability on acceptances (if included in total assets), 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, real estate assets, net property, plant and equipment and 
other assets; for Insurance Companies, total assets represent the sum of cash, total investments, 
premium balance receivables, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, net property, plant and 
equipment and other assets; and for Other Financial Companies, total assets represent the sum of cash 
& equivalents, receivables, securities inventory, custody securities, total investments, net loans, net 
property, plant and equipment, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and other assets. 
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We also collect information on observed ratings, using the following variables:  
 
· CRPlus = dummy variable that equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed. 
· CRMinus = dummy variable that equals 1 when a minus credit rating is 
observed. 
· CRPOM = dummy variable that equals 1 whether a plus or minus credit rating is 
observed (CRPlus + CRMinus). 
 
The CS-CR hypothesis implies that firms near a credit rating change will issue 
less debt compared to equity than firms that are not near a rating change. Kisgen 
considered that the ratings followed by a minus or a plus sign are the ones near a 
rating change. The above-described dummy variables are used to identify these firms. 
 
As control variables typically used in the capital structure literature and in the CS-
CR literature we consider: 
 
· Profitabilityit = EBITDAit-1/Ait-1 (EBITDA is Datastream item 1502). 
The expected sign for this variable’s coefficient depends on the country being 
studied. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that profitability is negatively 
correlated with leverage in the US, Japan, Italy and Canada; positively 
correlated in the UK; and no relationship was found in Germany and France. 
 
· Sizeit = ln(Salesit-1) (Sales is Datastream item 104). 
This variable’s coefficient is expected to be positive as it is a measure of a 
firm’s financial distress – considering that larger firms have a lower 
probability of default, the positive sign implies that larger firms issue more 
debt relative to equity. 
 
· Leverageit = Dit-1/(Dit-1 + Eit-1). 
A firm that already has a high leverage ratio will tend to issue less debt 







This work will focus on the impact of a change in rating in the capital structure of 
firms in the Euro Area. Therefore the original sample consists of firms that constitute 
the following indexes and countries: 
 
· PSI20 – Portugal 
· IBEX35 – Spain 
· FTSE MIB – Italy 
· ATHEX20 – Greece 
· CAC40 – France 
· DAX – Germany 
 
As the study necessarily involves credit ratings, all the firms from the original 
sample that do not feature S&P’s long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters 
were removed.  
The sample period goes from 1996 to 2011, to avoid inconsistencies due to 
currency changes, as 1995 is the first year where most data is available in Euro. All 
other variables for which we require data were extracted from Datastream, in order to 
make my study comparable to Kisgen (2006). I used book values as well as Kisgen.  
 
All the firm-years where some of the data was missing were excluded from the 
sample, in similarity to Kisgen’s study. The final sample is constituted by 1202 firm-




Sample Distribution per Country – 1996 to 2011 
 
 
Greece Portugal Spain Italy France Germany TOTAL
Number of Firms, of which: 9 9 15 22 32 26 113
 are Financial Institutions 4 4 6 8 3 3 28
Number of Firm-Years, of which: 81 89 156 207 388 281 1202
are from Financial Institutions 36 39 63 96 47 36 317
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The six indexes total 185 firms. Only 113 firms detain a S&P credit rating. The 
indexes consider the most important firms of each country’s stock exchange. 
The fact that only 61% of the most important firms quoted in the stock exchange 
of each country detain a S&P credit rating shows that the US debt market is very 
different from the debt markets in Europe –  US firms use debt issuance to finance 
their needs more than the European firms (only firms that detain a credit rating are 
allowed to issue debt).  
 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
 
In Table II, the summary statistics concerning leverage per credit rating are 
presented, as well as the number of firm-years that correspond to each credit rating 
level.  
 
Kisgen’s sample results showed a negative relationship between the debt to total 
capitalization ratio and the credit ratings. Leverage levels, when compared to the 
firm’s total value, were expected to decrease with the quality of the credit rating. This 






Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number 
of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-year. The sample consist of firms from 1996 
to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with no 
S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, 
common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total 




The sample used in this study considers different countries and a period of severe 
financial crisis, which may explain why the referred relationship does not hold. For 
this reason I calculated the same statistics per country and for three periods of time: 
from 1996 to 2006 (before the crisis), from 2007 to 2011 (after the crisis) and from 
1996 to 2011. These statistics are showed in Tables A1-A3 of the Appendix A. 
When analyzing each country separately for each period of time, the expected 
negative relationship between the debt to total capitalization ratio and the credit 
ratings is still not observable for all the credit ratings per period and per country. 
However, it is interesting to observe the discrepancies in the distribution of firm-years 
by credit ratings between the different countries, e.g. peripheral countries such as 
Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy have less firm-years with higher credit ratings when 
compared to France or Germany (the only countries in the sample with AAA credit 
ratings). 
 
In the period from 2007 to 2011 an overall downgrade of the ratings is observed, 
accompanied by a relevant increase of the average leverage ratio. This effect was 
expected as the financial crisis forced firms to increase their debt levels, leading to a 
rise in their probability of default and, consequently, the credit rating agencies 
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A
14 14 88 163 129 179
Mean 46.9% 52.8% 61.4% 62.2% 61.7% 67.2%
Median 42.1% 47.4% 68.4% 60.0% 59.1% 73.0%
Standard Deviation 21.7% 26.0% 24.6% 25.0% 19.5% 22.4%
A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB
199 169 119 45 36 32
Mean 64.2% 58.2% 51.2% 47.5% 51.7% 57.8%
Median 66.9% 59.4% 50.6% 46.3% 50.9% 51.5%
Standard Deviation 22.6% 20.1% 16.4% 19.5% 17.3% 20.2%
BB- B+ B B- CCC+ OR 
BELOW
TOTAL
9 4 2 0 0 1202
Mean 57.2% 62.8% 56.8% 0.0% 0.0% 60.2%
Median 55.4% 59.6% 56.8% 0.0% 0.0% 58.9%









downgraded the firms credit ratings. This increase of the leverage ratio, during the 
referred period, is not only explained by the increase in debt levels, but also by a 
decrease in equity values. During this period many firms suffered multiple rating 
downgrades and many firms declared bankruptcy. These firms were not excluded 
from the sample. 
 
Table A4 of the Appendix A shows the means, standard deviations and the 
number of observation of net debt minus net equity divided by beginning-of-year total 
assets (NetDIss) per country (Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, Spain, Germany) and 
for the full sample by firm-years with a minus credit rating, a plus credit rating, either 
(minus or plus) credit rating and with a credit rating that is neither plus or minus. 
NetDIss is the dependent variable of the regressions that constitute the model and is 
expected to be negative if a firm is near a broad rating change (in the case of a plus or 
minus credit rating) and is expected to be positive otherwise. This relationship is only 
observable for Italy for the period between 1996 and 2006, even though some 
negative values can be observed for firms near a broad rating change (e.g., negative 
values are observable for the three time periods of France). 
 
Excluding financial institutions, the sample is reduced to 85 firms, corresponding 
to 885 firm-years. Summary statistics concerning leverage per credit rating are 
presented in Tables B1-B3 of Appendix B, including the number of firm-years that 
correspond to each credit rating level. The exclusion of financial institutions had no 
impact as regards the expected negative relationship between the debt to total 
capitalization ratio and the credit ratings, as this relationship is still not observable for 
each period of each country. Regarding the net debt issuance statistics presented in 
Table B4 of Appendix B, the expected negative value for this variable is observable in 
most countries for firms that are near a broad rating change. All in all, the average net 
debt issuance is positive only in the case of Greece, for the period from 1996 to 2011, 
for firms not near a broad rating change. 
 
The analysis of sample statistics suggests that the results will not be consistent 







A firm with a plus or a minus credit rating is closer to a Broad Rating change. The 
following regressions will be used to test the hypothesis that firms with a plus or 
minus credit rating will tend to issue less debt than those not so close from a broad 
rating change: 
 
(1) NetDIssit = a + b0CRPOM + f1Sizeit + f2Leverageit + f3Profitabilityit + eit 
 
(2) NetDIssit = a + b1CRPlus + b2CRMinus + f4Sizeit + f5Leverageit + f6Profitabilityit + eit 
 
(3) NetDIssit = a + b3CRPOM + eit 
 
The objective of these tests is to verify if firms near a credit rating downgrade or 
upgrade in the beginning of a year will show a different behavior in terms of debt 
issuance during that year. As in Kisgen (2006), the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0: bi = 0  i= 0, 1, 2, 3 
H1: bi ≠ 0  i= 0, 1, 2, 3 
 
The CR-CS Hypothesis states that firms near a broad rating change will tend to 
issue less debt, so the b coefficients are expected to be negative. The null hypothesis 
implies that credit ratings have no impact in credit rating decisions. 
The model used for the test was the cross-section time-series random effects GLS 
regression with robust standard errors. A panel data econometric model was used in 
order to study the behavior of different firms across time. The random effects GLS 
was the chosen model because it deals well with unbalanced data and is ideal for 
micro panels (datasets where the time dimension is largely less important than the 
individual dimension, i.e., datasets with few years and a large number of cases), 
which is the case of the sample being studied. This model allows drawing inferences 
about the whole population in addition to the examined sample. For short panels 
cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation do not constitute a relevant problem. 
The use of robust standard errors provides heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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5. Main Results 
 
 
The results of the CR-CS Hypothesis tests for the full sample, i.e. for all the 
countries from 1996 to 2011, are presented in Table III below.  
The coefficients of the credit rating dummy variables CRPOM, CRPlus and CRMinus are 
negative, as expected by the CR-CS Theory. However, the respective p-values are not 
below the 10% significance level, leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
When analyzing the control variables, the respective coefficients are negative, which 
should not be expected for the leverage control variable. 
 
Table III 
Regressions of the Plus or Minus Tests 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust 
errors of NetDIss on credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. 
NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables 
are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 1 when a minus credit rating is 
observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book total debt 
divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. 
Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 
1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with 
no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, 
common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, and * denote significance at 




Differences in jurisdiction between the countries in the sample may lead to 
different results if the tests were to be performed by country. Additionally, and 
1 2 3
Cons 0,1795*** 0,1770** 0,0093**
(0,0519) (0,0529) (0,0046)
CRPOM -0,0051 - -0,0058
(0,0059) - (0,0061)
CRMinus - -0,0026 -
- (0,0084) -
CRPlus - -0,0080 -
- (0,0061) -
Leverage -0,0260 -0,0255 -
(0,0205) (0,0203) -
Size -0,0089*** -0,0087*** -
(0,0028) (0,0028) -
Profitability -0,1145** -0,1128** -
(0,0579) (0,0576) -
Number of firm-years 1202 1202 1202
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mentioned above, it may be relevant to study three periods in time: from 1996 to 2006 
(before the crisis), from 2007 to 2011 (after the crisis) and from 1996 to 2011. The 
results of these tests are presented in Tables A5-A7 of Appendix A.  
The p-value of the dummy variable CRPOM is below the 10% significance level in 
the following cases: regression 1 in the case of Portugal from 1996 to 2011 and 
regression 3 in the case of Italy from 2007 to 2011. Regarding Portugal, the variable 
CRPOM is significant at the 5% level, while the control variables leverage and 
profitability are significant at the 1% level (the control variable size is not statistically 
significant). As regards Italy, CRPOM is significant at the 10% level. In both cases, the 
respective coefficient presents a positive value. 
The p-values of the dummy variables CRPlus and CRMinus are below the 10% 
significance level in some cases, but never for both variables in the same regression. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The coefficients of all credit rating dummy variables for France and Germany are 
above the 10% significance level for the different time periods.   
 
The regressions of the plus or minus tests, for the three time periods for each 
country, were also estimated excluding financial institutions from the sample. The 





Regressions of the Plus or Minus Tests Excluding Financial Institutions from the 
Sample 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust 
errors of NetDIss on credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. 
NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables 
are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 1 when a minus credit rating is 
observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book total debt 
divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. 
Profitability is EBITDA divided by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 
1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding financial 
institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any 
relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, 




Considering the sample with all the countries for the time period from 1996 to 
2011, the results lead to the same conclusion as if considering the full sample 
(including financial institutions): the coefficients of the credit rating dummy variables 
CRPOM, CRPlus and CRMinus are also negative and the respective p-values are not below 
the 10% significance level, leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis.  
The results of the test by country and for the already mentioned periods of time, 
excluding financial institutions from the sample, are showed in Tables B5-B7 of 
Appendix B. 
 
The p-value of the dummy variable CRPOM is below the 10% significance level in 
the following cases: regression 1 in the case of Portugal from 1996 to 2006 and also 
from 1996 to 2011. Considering the time period 1996-2006, the variable CRPOM is 
1 2 3
Cons 0,1074* 0,1076* -0,0006
(0,0595) (0,0607) (0,0046)
CRPOM -0,0039 - -0,0054
(0,0070) - (0,0066)
CRMinus - -0,0043 -
- (0,0110) -
CRPlus - -0,0035 -
- (0,0072) -
Leverage -0,0827** -0,0828** -
(0,0335) (0,0347) -
Size -0,0044 -0,0044 -
(0,0032) (0,0033) -
Profitability 0,0509 0,0511 -
(0,0747) (0,0756) -
Number of firm-years 885 885 885
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significant at the 10% level and the control variables leverage and profitability are 
significant at the 1% level (the control variable size is not statistically significant). As 
regards the time period 1996-2011, the variable CRPOM is significant at the 1% level, 
as well as the control variables leverage and profitability. The respective coefficient 
presents a positive value. 
 
Regarding the dummy variables CRPlus and CRMinus, the respective p-values are 
below the 10% significance level for some time periods, but only in the case of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. These two dummy variables are never significant for 
both variables in the same regression. Similar to the results incorporating financial 
institutions, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The coefficients of all credit rating dummy variables for Italy, France and 






This work studies if a possibility of a downgrade or upgrade of a firm’s credit 
rating has any significant impact in its capital structure choice, testing the CR-CS 
Hypothesis on a sample of European firms from six countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
Greece, France and Germany) from 1996 to 2011.  
 
I find that Portuguese firms tend to issue more net debt relative to equityand when 
near a broad rating change:  approximately 1%, including financial institutions in the 
sample;  approximately 2% and 5% for the time periods 1996-2011 and 1996-2006, 
respectively, excluding financial institutions. Italian firms, including financial 
institutions, tend to issue approximately 3% more net debt relative to equity when 
near a broad rating change. As regards the other countries considered in this study, no 
statistically significant relationship was identified, as well as when considering the 
sample of all six countries, whether including financial institutions or not. 
 
Kisgen (2006) proved that credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions, 
considering a sample of US firms. The plus or minus tests’ results considering a 
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European sample do not deliver the same conclusion. This fact might be explained by 
the difference between the markets – The US market for equity and debt is  more 
developed than the European markets (European firms tend to resort to bank loans in 
order to meet their funding needs more than to the equity or debt markets). Another 
relevant difference is the time period – this study considered a time period from 1996 
to 2011, as data in euros was mostly available from 1995 onwards. This time period 
includes the launching of the euro on 1 January 1999 only for accounting purposes, 
and on 1 January 2002 in cash. The recent global financial crisis and the sovereign 
debt crisis also contributed for the shutting of European markets. These are only a few 
of the period-specific events that occurred and that created many limitations regarding 
the firms’ financing choices.   
 
As regards future research, a possible way forward is to study whether the influence 
of credit ratings in the capital structure choice of firms varies for different industries. 
Another possibility is to increase the number of firms in the sample, including firms 
from the countries in this sample that do not constitute the country’s index and 
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Summary Statistics for Greece, Portugal and Spain — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20 and IBEX35, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the 
value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total debt divided by book total debt plus 
book common equity. 
 
 




Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 20 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Mean - - - - - 43,8% 49,4% 68,1% 67,2% 24,8% - - - - - - - 59,5%
Median - - - - - 44,7% 41,0% 68,1% 76,1% 24,8% - - - - - - - 54,3%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 3,2% 24,0% 17,0% 25,8% - - - - - - - - 20,2%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 14 8 3 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 45
Mean - - - - - 44,8% 86,9% 76,4% 69,1% 53,4% 53,5% 70,6% - - - - - 67,3%
Median - - - - - 43,8% 86,7% 80,8% 82,2% 41,8% 40,5% 58,8% - - - - - 76,5%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 4,6% 1,7% 14,1% 22,6% 21,3% 30,1% 32,0% - - - - - 23,1%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 12 8 34 11 4 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 81
Mean - - - - - 44,2% 63,5% 71,5% 68,6% 46,3% 53,5% 70,6% - - - - - 63,8%
Median - - - - - 44,3% 66,8% 76,1% 81,6% 41,1% 40,5% 58,8% - - - - - 59,5%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 3,7% 26,6% 16,2% 22,2% 22,5% 30,1% 32,0% - - - - - 22,1%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 2 4 7 5 26 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52
Mean - - 46,7% 63,0% 57,6% 64,6% 86,2% 64,2% 73,4% - - - - - - - - 73,9%
Median - - 46,7% 62,9% 59,1% 66,1% 90,3% 60,8% 73,4% - - - - - - - - 67,7%
Standard Deviation - - 2,8% 3,2% 5,0% 4,3% 12,5% 18,2% 36,9% - - - - - - - - 17,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 2 11 11 1 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
Mean - - - - 68,9% 85,2% 79,0% 91,0% 63,4% 73,3% - - - - - - - 76,9%
Median - - - - 68,9% 88,7% 74,0% 91,0% 62,1% 82,3% - - - - - - - 81,3%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 9,3% 10,6% - 10,3% 20,5% - - - - - - - 13,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 2 4 9 16 37 7 9 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89
Mean - - 46,7% 63,0% 60,1% 78,8% 84,1% 68,0% 65,7% 73,3% - - - - - - - 75,2%
Median - - 46,7% 62,9% 59,6% 86,4% 88,9% 61,5% 62,1% 82,3% - - - - - - - 72,1%
Standard Deviation - - 2,8% 3,2% 6,6% 12,6% 12,2% 19,5% 16,4% 20,5% - - - - - - - 16,1%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 11 27 24 20 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92
Mean - 44,4% 79,6% 65,1% 62,6% 74,6% 60,4% 35,3% 41,4% - - - - - - - - 66,4%
Median - 44,4% 82,0% 58,5% 57,8% 74,0% 59,0% 35,3% 41,4% - - - - - - - - 63,1%
Standard Deviation - 2,6% 9,0% 20,3% 18,1% 10,7% 12,3% 2,0% 3,4% - - - - - - - - 18,1%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 9 9 4 17 13 4 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 64
Mean - - 86,7% 76,9% 66,4% 79,8% 60,6% 73,4% 43,6% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 71,7%
Median - - 86,2% 72,6% 67,2% 87,2% 58,2% 73,3% 45,0% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 75,8%
Standard Deviation - - 2,2% 11,8% 25,2% 16,6% 12,6% 7,3% 11,4% - - - - - - - - 18,0%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 20 36 28 37 17 6 8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 156
Mean - 44,4% 82,8% 68,0% 63,1% 77,0% 60,6% 60,7% 43,0% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 68,6%
Median - 44,4% 84,7% 62,5% 57,8% 80,2% 58,9% 68,3% 43,9% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 70,8%























Summary Statistics for Italy, France and Germany — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the 
value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total debt divided by book total debt plus 
book common equity. 
 
 




Number of Firm-Years 0 0 8 11 12 33 24 11 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 105
Mean - - 31,9% 76,3% 69,9% 87,3% 69,0% 64,0% 49,6% - - - 73,9% - - - - 71,8%
Median - - 32,9% 82,6% 71,6% 89,2% 85,2% 72,5% 38,9% - - - 74,8% - - - - 85,2%
Standard Deviation - - 5,3% 15,7% 20,4% 7,7% 28,6% 24,5% 20,0% - - - 5,2% - - - - 23,6%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 5 15 9 14 24 12 11 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 102
Mean - - 47,2% 70,1% 75,4% 82,7% 73,9% 48,3% 52,9% 59,7% 72,2% 62,9% - - - - - 67,0%
Median - - 53,5% 82,5% 84,4% 84,8% 82,7% 55,2% 51,6% 61,2% 71,4% 62,9% - - - - - 72,4%
Standard Deviation - - 13,8% 18,9% 17,2% 5,0% 21,1% 25,3% 9,6% 10,1% 7,8% - - - - - - 20,3%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 13 26 21 47 48 23 14 7 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 207
Mean - - 37,8% 72,7% 72,3% 85,9% 71,4% 55,8% 52,2% 59,7% 72,2% 62,9% 73,9% - - - - 69,4%
Median - - 33,8% 82,6% 84,4% 87,5% 84,3% 62,1% 51,1% 61,2% 71,4% 62,9% 74,8% - - - - 79,8%
Standard Deviation - - 11,8% 17,6% 18,8% 7,2% 25,0% 25,6% 11,6% 10,1% 7,8% - 5,2% - - - - 22,1%
Number of Firm-Years 9 2 21 36 30 23 30 33 29 10 2 7 0 2 0 0 0 234
Mean 43,2% 47,4% 61,6% 63,4% 57,1% 36,3% 55,4% 58,7% 52,8% 39,3% 35,9% 54,7% - 59,6% - - - 54,3%
Median 43,5% 47,4% 66,2% 59,6% 51,3% 41,1% 58,3% 59,4% 51,7% 34,5% 35,9% 54,4% - 59,6% - - - 51,5%
Standard Deviation 6,1% 0,4% 26,0% 26,2% 22,4% 17,1% 16,6% 20,8% 12,9% 21,5% 14,6% 25,2% - 4,8% - - - 21,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 10 13 7 18 23 31 22 12 10 1 3 0 2 0 0 154
Mean - 87,2% 58,6% 80,2% 52,2% 44,3% 44,3% 52,9% 40,6% 37,3% 51,2% 57,8% 45,8% - 56,8% - - 50,6%
Median - 87,2% 57,6% 88,5% 45,9% 44,4% 46,3% 52,2% 37,6% 35,0% 53,6% 57,8% 51,7% - 56,8% - - 47,4%
Standard Deviation - 3,1% 27,7% 21,4% 24,9% 7,7% 12,9% 16,9% 10,5% 10,0% 16,4% - 13,5% - 4,1% - - 19,2%
Number of Firm-Years 9 4 31 49 37 41 53 64 51 22 12 8 3 2 2 0 0 388
Mean 43,2% 67,3% 60,7% 67,8% 56,2% 39,8% 50,6% 55,9% 47,5% 38,2% 48,7% 55,0% 45,8% 59,6% 56,8% - - 52,8%
Median 43,5% 66,4% 66,2% 86,3% 51,2% 42,4% 54,7% 55,6% 48,7% 35,0% 51,8% 54,6% 51,7% 59,6% 56,8% - - 50,7%
Standard Deviation 6,1% 23,0% 26,1% 25,9% 22,6% 14,2% 15,9% 19,1% 13,3% 15,8% 16,6% 23,4% 13,5% 4,8% 4,1% - - 20,8%
Number of Firm-Years 5 8 12 34 24 10 13 17 13 1 13 6 0 0 0 0 0 156
Mean 53,5% 47,6% 52,0% 48,5% 59,6% 69,5% 66,3% 51,8% 52,0% 30,9% 48,5% 48,2% - - - - - 54,0%
Median 33,6% 45,6% 37,3% 39,6% 64,1% 70,9% 66,9% 55,9% 57,9% 30,9% 45,8% 48,4% - - - - - 53,1%
Standard Deviation 37,0% 29,3% 25,7% 27,2% 15,8% 18,2% 22,8% 13,6% 17,8% - 11,6% 2,6% - - - - - 21,9%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 10 14 10 16 23 18 13 6 2 10 2 1 0 0 0 125
Mean - - 65,6% 41,1% 62,9% 63,9% 49,8% 45,3% 44,2% 49,1% 44,6% 56,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 52,0%
Median - - 75,7% 34,8% 60,2% 60,4% 40,2% 46,4% 48,7% 46,2% 44,6% 56,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 47,7%
Standard Deviation - - 20,9% 22,0% 21,4% 21,5% 18,6% 15,1% 14,3% 14,9% 2,9% 9,9% 2,6% - - - - 19,3%
Number of Firm-Years 5 8 22 48 34 26 36 35 26 7 15 16 2 1 0 0 0 281
Mean 53,5% 47,6% 58,2% 46,4% 60,6% 66,1% 55,8% 48,5% 48,1% 46,5% 48,0% 53,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 53,1%
Median 33,6% 45,6% 46,5% 37,6% 64,1% 62,0% 49,9% 53,6% 52,3% 45,7% 45,8% 49,1% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 49,2%























Sample Summary Statistics — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating 
in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total debt divided 









Number of Firm-Years 14 12 54 112 97 98 102 89 52 12 15 13 3 2 0 0 0 675
Mean 46,9% 47,0% 58,2% 60,5% 60,7% 66,7% 67,7% 60,0% 53,6% 37,4% 46,8% 51,7% 73,9% 59,6% - - - 60,4%
Median 42,1% 46,7% 59,9% 57,8% 58,3% 70,9% 69,7% 59,5% 51,7% 31,0% 45,8% 48,5% 74,8% 59,6% - - - 58,6%
Standard Deviation 21,7% 23,4% 25,1% 25,1% 18,9% 23,6% 23,3% 19,6% 16,4% 20,0% 12,3% 18,2% 5,2% 4,8% - - - 22,6%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 34 51 32 81 97 80 67 33 21 19 6 2 2 0 0 527
Mean - 87,2% 66,4% 65,9% 64,9% 67,8% 60,4% 56,1% 49,4% 51,1% 55,1% 62,0% 48,8% 65,9% 56,8% - - 59,9%
Median - 87,2% 80,0% 72,6% 68,9% 74,1% 62,0% 58,2% 48,5% 48,7% 52,3% 58,8% 49,5% 65,9% 56,8% - - 58,9%
Standard Deviation - 3,1% 23,2% 24,7% 21,5% 21,0% 21,2% 20,6% 16,3% 18,3% 19,7% 21,0% 11,4% 32,4% 4,1% - - 21,5%
Number of Firm-Years 14 14 88 163 129 179 199 169 119 45 36 32 9 4 2 0 0 1202
Mean 46,9% 52,8% 61,4% 62,2% 61,7% 67,2% 64,2% 58,2% 51,2% 47,5% 51,7% 57,8% 57,2% 62,8% 56,8% - - 60,2%
Median 42,1% 47,4% 68,4% 60,0% 59,1% 73,0% 66,9% 59,4% 50,6% 46,3% 50,9% 51,5% 55,4% 59,6% 56,8% - - 58,9%









Sample Summary Statistics — Net Debt Issuance 
Means, standard deviations and the number of observation of NetDIss (net debt minus net equity divided by beginning-of-year total assets) 
per country (Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, Spain, Germany) and for the full sample by firm-years with a minus credit rating, a plus credit 
rating, either (minus or plus) credit rating and with a credit rating that is neither plus or minus. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 
2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit 
rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from 
Datastream. NetDIss is (DDit - DEit)/Ait. 
 
  CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0.0249 0.0046 0.0093 0.0326 Average -0.0219 -0.0186 -0.0206 0.0218
Standard Deviation 0.0611 0.1263 0.1138 0.0580 Standard Deviation 0.3402 0.0715 0.2707 0.1005
Number Obs 6 20 26 10 Number Obs 38 23 61 44
Average -0.0264 0.0416 0.0253 0.0539 Average 0.0326 0.0329 0.0327 0.0050
Standard Deviation 0.0516 0.0825 0.0809 0.1013 Standard Deviation 0.0605 0.1367 0.0936 0.0699
Number Obs 6 19 25 20 Number Obs 46 25 71 31
Average -0.0008 0.0226 0.0171 0.0468 Average 0.0080 0.0082 0.0081 0.0148
Standard Deviation 0.0602 0.1075 0.0984 0.0887 Standard Deviation 0.2331 0.1123 0.1973 0.0890
Number Obs 12 39 51 30 Number Obs 84 48 132 75
CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0.0451 -0.0125 0.0277 0.0261 Average -0.0137 -0.0107 -0.0123 -0.0087
Standard Deviation 0.0898 0.1110 0.0990 0.0627 Standard Deviation 0.0987 0.1183 0.1081 0.0860
Number Obs 30 13 43 9 Number Obs 76 69 145 89
Average 0.0308 0.0164 0.0285 0.0197 Average -0.0100 -0.0026 -0.0064 -0.0022
Standard Deviation 0.0615 0.0696 0.0610 0.1106 Standard Deviation 0.0815 0.0510 0.0679 0.0711
Number Obs 16 3 19 18 Number Obs 51 50 101 53
Average 0.0401 -0.0071 0.0280 0.0218 Average -0.0122 -0.0073 -0.0099 -0.0063
Standard Deviation 0.0806 0.1031 0.0886 0.0960 Standard Deviation 0.0918 0.0957 0.0936 0.0806
Number Obs 46 16 62 27 Number Obs 127 119 246 142
CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0.0361 0.0082 0.0229 0.0579 Average 0.0135 -0.0034 0.0040 -0.0061
Standard Deviation 0.1204 0.0681 0.0993 0.0813 Standard Deviation 0.0952 0.0674 0.0808 0.0881
Number Obs 31 28 59 33 Number Obs 48 62 110 46
Average 0.0281 0.0048 0.0215 0.0189 Average -0.0113 -0.0188 -0.0144 -0.0105
Standard Deviation 0.0851 0.0457 0.0761 0.0798 Standard Deviation 0.1034 0.0885 0.0971 0.0799
Number Obs 23 9 32 32 Number Obs 45 31 76 49
Average 0.0327 0.0074 0.0224 0.0387 Average 0.0015 -0.0085 -0.0035 -0.0083
Standard Deviation 0.1060 0.0628 0.0914 0.0823 Standard Deviation 0.0995 0.0750 0.0880 0.0836
Number Obs 54 37 91 65 Number Obs 93 93 186 95
CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0.0061 -0.0057 0.0004 0.0103
Standard Deviation 0.1658 0.0950 0.1361 0.0894
Number Obs 229 215 444 231
Average 0.0078 0.0072 0.0076 0.0077
Standard Deviation 0.0830 0.0868 0.0845 0.0829
Number Obs 187 137 324 203
Average 0.0069 -0.0006 0.0034 0.0091
Standard Deviation 0.1349 0.0920 0.1172 0.0863






























Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure – Greece, Spain and Portugal 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 
1 when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book 
total debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA 
divided by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20 and 
IBEX35, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total 
debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
0,4262 -0,0125 -0,1244 -0,0197 -0,3577
(0,4485) (0,0278) (0,0955) (0,0273) (0,2454)
0,2952 0,0059 -0,0206 -0,1139 -0,0109 -0,4245
(0,3493) (0,0232) (0,0409) (0,0732) (0,0237) (0,3319)
0,0326*** -0,0233
(0,0109) (0,0355)
-0,0394 -0,0313 0,0176 0,0063 -0,1731
(0,3143) (0,0343) (0,0795) (0,0246) (0,1262)
-0,0155 -0,0814*** -0,0157 0,0245 0,0044 -0,1544
(0,2545) (0,0257) (0,0402) (0,0759) (0,0204) (0,1210)
0,0539** -0,0286
(0,0246) (0,0346)
-0,1390 -0,0257 -0,0596 0,0161 -0,2807***
(0,2811) (0,0237) (0,0548) (0,0204) (0,1074)
-0,0676 -0,0425* -0,0216 -0,0456 0,0106 -0,2476*
(0,2505) (0,0239) (0,0289) (0,0566) (0,0185) (0,1324)
0,0482** -0,0308
(0,0202) (0,0240)
0,2991*** 0,0305 -0,3541** 0,0031 -0,9711***
(0,1091) (0,0210) (0,1539) (0,0106) (0,3377)
0,3340*** 0,0539 -0,0105 -0,3508* -0,0011 -0,7246*
(0,1152) (0,0329) (0,0201) (0,1933) (0,0083) (0,3759)
0,0261*** 0,0017
(0,0097) (0,0128)
0,1999** 0,0084 -0,2772** 0,0037 -0,2997***
(0,0967) (0,0177) (0,1328) (0,0081) (0,0083)
0,2380* 0,0129 -0,0113 -0,2749** 0,0011 -0,3119***
(0,1238) (0,0222) (0,0292) (0,1359) (0,0078) (0,0921)
0,01972** 0,0088
(0,0083) (0,0146)
0,2357*** 0,0160** -0,2540*** 0,0012 -0,5854***
(0,0853) (0,0075) (0,0549) (0,0075) (0,0867)
0,3257*** 0,0314** -0,0311 -0,2693*** -0,0046 -0,4878***
(0,0740) (0,0131) (0,0219) (0,0907) (0,0059) (0,0968)
0,0218*** 0,0061
(0,0072) (0,0117)
0,3882 -0,0185 0,0216 -0,0243 0,3878
(0,2907) (0,1369) (0,1119) (0,0187) (0,3037)
0,3257 -0,0057 -0,0271* 0,0170 -0,0201 0,3459
(0,2791) (0,0148) (0,0163) (0,1038) (0,0175) (0,3097)
0,0501*** -0,0076
(0,0176) (0,0120)
0,4942*** -0,0011 -0,1648*** -0,0210*** -0,1460
(0,1267) (0,0220) (0,0440) (0,0065) (0,1838)
0,4974*** 0,0084 -0,0216 -0,1678*** -0,0211*** -0,1501
(0,1301) (0,0229) (0,0247) (0,0476) (0,0065) (0,1841)
0,0253* 0,0013
(0,0153) (0,0213)
0,4172*** -0,0173 -0,0646 -0,0210*** 0,0626
(0,1378) (0,0163) (0,0650) (0,0077) (0,2926)
0,4175*** -0,0067 -0,0320 -0,0761 -0,0205** 0,0578




































































Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure – Italy, France and Germany 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 1 
when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book total 
debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided 
by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, 
excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, 




Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
0,9058** -0,0478 -0,0842 -0,0516** -0,0050
(0,4339) (0,0481) (0,1304) (0,0257) (0,3541)
0,9701** -0,0635 -0,0209 -0,0971 -0,0550* -0,0402
(0,4742) (0,0696) (0,0225) (0,1266) (0,0290) (0,3431)
0,0228 -0,0468
(0,0183) (0,0440)
0,1272* 0,0244 -0,0344 -0,0059 -0,0358
(0,0761) (0,0158) (0,0310) (0,0045) (0,1098)
0,1274 0,0243 0,0246 -0,0342 -0,0059 -0,0356
(0,0760) (0,0171) (0,0242) (0,0260) (0,0043) (0,1115)
0,0050 0,0278*
(0,0128) (0,0152)
0,4852** -0,0150 -0,0758 -0,0252** -0,1270
(0,2170) (0,0224) (0,0596) (0,0118) (0,0844)
0,5003** -0,0213 -0,0042 -0,0713 -0,0264** -0,1205
(0,2322) (0,0318) (0,0146) (0,0515) (0,0133) (0,0975)
0,0148 -0,0068
(0,0115) (0,0176)
-0,1433 -0,0072 -0,1245** 0,0139 -0,2763**
(0,1353) (0,0161) (0,0507) (0,0089) (0,1366)
-0,1346 -0,0121 -0,0034 -0,1310** 0,0137 -0,2884**
(0,1452) (0,0194) (0,0195) (0,0530) (0,0094) (0,1332)
-0,0035 -0,0122
(0,0112) (0,0161)
-0,0518 -0,0071 -0,0517 0,0059 -0,2544**
(0,0646) (0,0110) (0,0367) (0,0041) (0,1224)
-0,0548 -0,0109 -0,0029 -0,0531 0,0061 -0,2539**
(0,0685) (0,0139) (0,0109) (0,0381) (0,0044) (0,1267)
-0,0022 -0,0041
(0,0081) (0,0114)
-0,1415* -0,0019 -0,0537* 0,0108** -0,1959**
(0,0778) (0,0096) (0,0292) (0,0050) (0,0973)
-0,1399* -0,0039 0,0002 -0,0538* 0,0107** -0,1968**
(0,0810) (0,0119) (0,0113) (0,0295) (0,0052) (0,0970)
-0,0063 -0,0036
(0,0068) (0,0101)
-0,0309 0,0138 -0,0516 0,0037 -0,1286
(0,1320) (0,0171) (0,0469) (0,0072) (0,1488)
-0,0110 0,0278 0,0047 -0,0453 0,0023 -0,1253
(0,1386) (0,0253) (0,0154) (0,0432) (0,0074) (0,1582)
-0,0085 0,0133
(0,0142) (0,0160)
-0,1316 -0,0178 -0,1113** 0,0103 0,1099
(0,2035) (0,0187) (0,0515) (0,0115) (0,2099)
-0,1317 -0,0165 -0,0199 -0,1143** 0,0104 0,1090
(0,2061) (0,0197) (0,0244) (0,0527) (0,0116) (0,2133)
-0,0105 -0,0039
(0,0111) (0,0150)
-0,0657 0,0026 -0,0414 0,0047 0,0064
(0,1093) (0,1093) (0,0278) (0,0062) (0,1130)
-0,0596 0,0075 -0,0018 -0,0437 0,0043 0,0104





































































Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure – Full Sample 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 1 
when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book total 
debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided 
by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE 
MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant 
variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
0,2460*** -0,0108 -0,0646* -0,0111** -0,1649*
(0,0880) (0,0110) (0,0349) (0,0048) (0,0996)
0,2397* -0,0061 -0,0154* -0,0633* -0,0108** -0,1590
(0,0915) (0,0162) (0,0092) (0,0347) (0,0050) (0,0982)
0,0118* -0,0122
(0,0071) (0,0108)
0,1787*** 0,0004 -0,0250 -0,0091*** -0,0842
(0,0411) (0,0071) (0,0162) (0,0023) (0,0638)
0,1790*** 0,0006 0,0002 -0,0253 -0,0091*** -0,0845
(0,0412) (0,0080) (0,0094) (0,0162) (0,0023) (0,0646)
0,0077 -0,0001
(0,0052) (0,0072)
0,1795*** -0,0051 -0,0260 -0,0089*** -0,1145**
(0,0519) (0,0059) (0,0205) (0,0028) (0,0579)
0,1770** -0,0026 -0,0080 -0,0255 -0,0087*** -0,1128**







































Summary Statistics Excluding Financial Institutions for Greece, Portugal and Spain — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20 and IBEX35, excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in 
Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total debt divided by 








Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 7 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Mean - - - - - 43,8% 39,2% 59,7% - - - - - - - - - 50,0%
Median - - - - - 44,7% 40,4% 53,1% - - - - - - - - - 45,9%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 3,2% 8,4% 20,4% - - - - - - - - - 16,5%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 5 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 25
Mean - - - - - 44,8% - 61,7% 58,2% 53,4% 40,1% 45,8% - - - - - 50,6%
Median - - - - - 43,8% - 60,8% 46,4% 41,8% 40,3% 44,6% - - - - - 43,8%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 4,6% - 18,9% 22,1% 21,3% 4,0% 10,9% - - - - - 15,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 0 12 4 13 5 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 45
Mean - - - - - 44,2% 39,2% 60,3% 58,2% 53,4% 40,1% 45,8% - - - - - 50,4%
Median - - - - - 44,3% 40,4% 53,1% 46,4% 41,8% 40,3% 44,6% - - - - - 44,8%
Standard Deviation - - - - - 3,7% 8,4% 19,2% 22,1% 21,3% 4,0% 10,9% - - - - - 15,9%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 2 4 7 5 4 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Mean - - 46,7% 63,0% 57,6% 64,6% 67,5% 57,0% 47,3% - - - - - - - - 59,8%
Median - - 46,7% 62,9% 59,1% 66,1% 68,7% 60,2% 47,3% - - - - - - - - 60,8%
Standard Deviation - - 2,8% 3,2% 5,0% 4,3% 12,0% 5,8% 0,0% - - - - - - - - 8,2%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 0 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Mean - - - - 68,9% 66,9% 70,1% - 63,4% 73,3% - - - - - - - 68,3%
Median - - - - 68,9% 66,9% 69,5% - 62,1% 82,3% - - - - - - - 68,9%
Standard Deviation - - - - 0,0% 0,4% 1,9% - 10,3% 20,5% - - - - - - - 11,2%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 2 4 9 7 10 5 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Mean - - 46,7% 63,0% 60,1% 65,3% 69,1% 57,0% 61,4% 73,3% - - - - - - - 63,5%
Median - - 46,7% 62,9% 59,6% 66,6% 69,5% 60,2% 60,3% 82,3% - - - - - - - 63,0%
Standard Deviation - - 2,8% 3,2% 6,6% 3,7% 7,2% 5,8% 11,1% 20,5% - - - - - - - 10,4%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 2 18 18 8 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56
Mean - 44,4% 64,3% 52,1% 53,9% 66,6% 60,4% 35,3% 41,4% - - - - - - - - 54,5%
Median - 44,4% 64,3% 52,9% 56,4% 66,3% 59,0% 35,3% 41,4% - - - - - - - - 56,8%
Standard Deviation - 2,6% 9,0% 9,9% 10,9% 5,7% 12,3% 2,0% 3,4% - - - - - - - - 11,6%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 0 5 2 5 13 4 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 37
Mean - - - 67,5% 44,6% 67,3% 60,6% 73,4% 43,6% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 61,1%
Median - - - 69,4% 44,6% 67,3% 58,2% 73,3% 45,0% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 64,2%
Standard Deviation - - - 5,6% 3,5% 13,2% 12,6% 7,3% 11,4% - - - - - - - - 14,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 2 2 23 20 13 17 6 8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 93
Mean - 44,4% 64,3% 55,5% 53,0% 66,9% 60,6% 60,7% 43,0% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 57,1%
Median - 44,4% 64,3% 57,1% 55,8% 67,3% 58,9% 68,3% 43,9% - - - 64,2% 88,8% - - - 57,9%























Summary Statistics Excluding Financial Institutions for Italy, France and Germany — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in 
Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + equity) is book total debt divided by 








Number of Firm-Years 0 0 8 4 6 8 8 8 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 48
Mean - - 31,9% 61,6% 51,1% 81,0% 34,2% 54,9% 49,6% - - - 73,9% - - - - 52,9%
Median - - 32,9% 55,9% 54,4% 83,1% 28,7% 65,5% 38,9% - - - 74,8% - - - - 53,4%
Standard Deviation - - 5,3% 18,8% 7,4% 13,6% 24,2% 22,5% 20,0% - - - 5,2% - - - - 23,4%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 5 7 4 3 9 12 11 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 63
Mean - - 47,2% 52,7% 61,8% 74,4% 54,5% 48,3% 52,9% 59,7% 72,2% 62,9% - - - - - 55,5%
Median - - 53,5% 56,1% 68,5% 74,1% 62,7% 55,2% 51,6% 61,2% 71,4% 62,9% - - - - - 60,8%
Standard Deviation - - 13,8% 12,8% 18,4% 0,9% 24,3% 25,3% 9,6% 10,1% 7,8% 0,0% - - - - - 17,9%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 13 11 10 11 17 20 14 7 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 111
Mean - - 37,8% 55,9% 55,4% 79,2% 45,0% 50,9% 52,2% 59,7% 72,2% 62,9% 73,9% - - - - 54,4%
Median - - 33,8% 56,1% 56,0% 75,9% 32,3% 58,2% 51,1% 61,2% 71,4% 62,9% 74,8% - - - - 57,3%
Standard Deviation - - 11,8% 15,0% 13,2% 11,8% 25,7% 23,8% 11,6% 10,1% 7,8% - 5,2% - - - - 20,4%
Number of Firm-Years 9 2 11 20 24 23 30 33 29 10 2 7 0 2 0 0 0 202
Mean 43,2% 47,4% 40,0% 42,3% 48,1% 36,3% 55,4% 58,7% 52,8% 39,3% 35,9% 54,7% - 59,6% - - - 48,8%
Median 43,5% 47,4% 32,2% 38,6% 48,8% 41,1% 58,3% 59,4% 51,7% 34,5% 35,9% 54,4% - 59,6% - - - 49,3%
Standard Deviation 6,1% 0,4% 15,9% 14,3% 14,4% 17,1% 16,6% 20,8% 12,9% 21,5% 14,6% 25,2% - 4,8% - - - 18,0%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 5 7 5 18 23 31 22 12 10 1 3 0 2 0 0 139
Mean - - 32,4% 73,5% 39,0% 44,3% 44,3% 52,9% 40,6% 37,3% 51,2% 57,8% 45,8% - 56,8% - - 46,7%
Median - - 32,8% 88,5% 35,9% 44,4% 46,3% 52,2% 37,6% 35,0% 53,6% 57,8% 51,7% - 56,8% - - 44,7%
Standard Deviation - - 1,3% 28,4% 12,8% 7,7% 12,9% 16,9% 10,5% 10,0% 16,4% - 13,5% - 4,1% - - 15,9%
Number of Firm-Years 9 2 16 27 29 41 53 64 51 22 12 8 3 2 2 0 0 341
Mean 43,2% 47,4% 37,6% 50,4% 46,5% 39,8% 50,6% 55,9% 47,5% 38,2% 48,7% 55,0% 45,8% 59,6% 56,8% - - 47,9%
Median 43,5% 47,4% 32,5% 40,2% 47,0% 42,4% 54,7% 55,6% 48,7% 35,0% 51,8% 54,6% 51,7% 59,6% 56,8% - - 47,3%
Standard Deviation 6,1% 0,4% 13,5% 23,0% 14,4% 14,2% 15,9% 19,1% 13,3% 15,8% 16,6% 23,4% 13,5% 4,8% 4,1% - - 17,2%
Number of Firm-Years 3 4 8 28 24 9 9 17 13 1 13 6 0 0 0 0 0 135
Mean 26,7% 21,7% 35,2% 39,2% 59,6% 66,6% 53,4% 51,8% 52,0% 30,9% 48,5% 48,2% - - - - - 48,6%
Median 25,6% 22,3% 34,1% 35,8% 64,1% 70,0% 48,1% 55,9% 57,9% 30,9% 45,8% 48,4% - - - - - 48,1%
Standard Deviation 6,5% 4,5% 6,8% 19,7% 15,8% 16,6% 12,8% 13,6% 17,8% - 11,6% 2,6% - - - - - 18,0%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 4 13 7 12 22 18 13 6 2 10 2 1 0 0 0 110
Mean - - 42,0% 37,0% 51,8% 54,5% 47,8% 45,3% 44,2% 49,1% 44,6% 56,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 47,2%
Median - - 42,3% 34,8% 48,5% 51,4% 40,0% 46,4% 48,7% 46,2% 44,6% 56,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 45,5%
Standard Deviation - - 1,7% 16,4% 14,2% 15,8% 16,0% 15,1% 14,3% 14,9% 2,9% 9,9% 2,6% - - - - 14,9%
Number of Firm-Years 3 4 12 41 31 21 31 35 26 7 15 16 2 1 0 0 0 245
Mean 26,7% 21,7% 37,5% 38,5% 57,9% 59,7% 49,4% 48,5% 48,1% 46,5% 48,0% 53,3% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 48,0%
Median 25,6% 22,3% 37,3% 34,8% 62,0% 59,7% 47,6% 53,6% 52,3% 45,7% 45,8% 49,1% 45,5% 43,0% - - - 46,7%























Sample Summary Statistics Excluding Financial Institutions — Ratings and Leverage 
Means, medians, and standard deviations of debt/(debt+equity) by credit rating within the sample, and the number of firm-years that had the indicated rating at the beginning of the firm-
year. The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term 
domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. Debt/(debt + 










Number of Firm-Years 12 8 31 74 79 60 59 74 48 11 15 13 3 2 0 0 0 489
Mean 39,1% 33,8% 38,7% 45,7% 54,0% 54,1% 52,3% 56,1% 51,8% 38,5% 46,8% 51,7% 73,9% 59,6% - - - 50,5%
Median 39,4% 34,5% 33,7% 43,0% 55,8% 53,9% 54,7% 55,8% 51,6% 31,2% 45,8% 48,5% 74,8% 59,6% - - - 51,0%
Standard Deviation 9,5% 13,4% 13,0% 17,2% 13,8% 21,5% 18,2% 18,6% 14,3% 20,5% 12,3% 18,2% 5,2% 4,8% - - - 17,7%
Number of Firm-Years 0 0 14 32 20 45 73 69 64 33 20 16 6 2 2 0 0 396
Mean - - 40,4% 53,2% 51,6% 52,6% 51,6% 51,8% 47,6% 51,1% 52,5% 54,2% 48,8% 65,9% 56,8% - - 51,0%
Median - - 36,7% 50,2% 47,8% 48,4% 52,5% 54,4% 47,0% 48,7% 51,8% 54,2% 49,5% 65,9% 56,8% - - 49,1%
Standard Deviation - - 10,1% 23,1% 15,9% 14,3% 16,8% 18,7% 14,3% 18,3% 16,2% 10,5% 11,4% 32,4% 4,1% - - 16,8%
Number of Firm-Years 12 8 45 106 99 105 132 143 112 44 35 29 9 4 2 0 0 885
Mean 39,1% 33,8% 39,2% 47,9% 53,5% 53,5% 51,9% 54,0% 49,4% 48,0% 50,1% 53,1% 57,2% 62,8% 56,8% - - 50,7%
Median 39,4% 34,5% 33,7% 43,8% 55,7% 49,8% 53,5% 55,6% 49,5% 46,5% 50,6% 50,3% 55,4% 59,6% 56,8% - - 50,3%









Sample Summary Statistics Excluding Financial Institutions — Net Debt Issuance 
Means, standard deviations and the number of observation of NetDIss (net debt minus net equity divided by beginning-of-year total 
assets)  per country (Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, Spain, Germany) and for the full sample by firm-years with a minus credit rating, a 
plus credit rating, either (minus or plus) credit rating and with a credit rating that is neither plus or minus. The sample consists of firms 
from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding financial institutions, firms with no 
S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total 
assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. NetDIss is (DDit - DEit)/Ait. 
 
  
CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0,0313 -0,0496 -0,0247 0,0243 Average -0,1034 -0,0332 -0,0695 -0,0242
Standard Deviation 0,0582 0,1215 0,1104 0,0656 Standard Deviation 0,5342 0,0869 0,3840 0,0977
Number Obs 4 9 13 7 Number Obs 15 14 29 19
Average -0,0572 0,0413 0,0145 0,0309 Average 0,0153 0,0462 0,0297 -0,0058
Standard Deviation 0,0488 0,1041 0,1009 0,1067 Standard Deviation 0,0603 0,1495 0,1107 0,0758
Number Obs 3 8 11 14 Number Obs 23 20 43 20
Average -0,0066 -0,0068 -0,0068 0,0287 Average -0,0315 0,0135 -0,0103 -0,0148
Standard Deviation 0,0687 0,1196 0,1058 0,0933 Standard Deviation 0,3371 0,1320 0,2604 0,0865
Number Obs 7 17 24 21 Number Obs 38 34 72 39
CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0,0622 -0,0166 0,0149 0,0277 Average -0,0200 -0,0172 -0,0186 -0,0115
Standard Deviation 0,1339 0,1149 0,1258 0,0669 Standard Deviation 0,1074 0,1177 0,1123 0,0865
Number Obs 8 12 20 8 Number Obs 60 63 123 79
Average 0,0413 0,0484 0,0424 0,0270 Average -0,0153 -0,0060 -0,0106 -0,0004
Standard Deviation 0,0626 0,0594 0,0598 0,1492 Standard Deviation 0,0843 0,0490 0,0685 0,0739
Number Obs 11 2 13 9 Number Obs 45 46 91 48
Average 0,0501 -0,0073 0,0258 0,0273 Average -0,0180 -0,0125 -0,0152 -0,0073
Standard Deviation 0,0963 0,1095 0,1045 0,1144 Standard Deviation 0,0977 0,0948 0,0961 0,0819
Number Obs 19 14 33 17 Number Obs 105 109 214 127
CRminus CRplus CRpom none CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average 0,0399 -0,0055 0,0172 0,0254 Average 0,0030 -0,0065 -0,0027 -0,0026
Standard Deviation 0,1390 0,0573 0,1076 0,1078 Standard Deviation 0,0978 0,0683 0,0809 0,0828
Number Obs 22 22 44 12 Number Obs 38 58 96 39
Average 0,0252 0,0067 0,0202 0,0293 Average -0,0139 -0,0213 -0,0168 -0,0067
Standard Deviation 0,0928 0,0526 0,0833 0,1043 Standard Deviation 0,1034 0,0923 0,0986 0,0851
Number Obs 19 7 26 11 Number Obs 43 28 71 39
Average 0,0331 -0,0026 0,0183 0,0273 Average -0,0060 -0,0113 -0,0087 -0,0047
Standard Deviation 0,1187 0,0555 0,0986 0,1037 Standard Deviation 0,1006 0,0767 0,0889 0,0835
Number Obs 41 29 70 23 Number Obs 81 86 167 78
CRminus CRplus CRpom none
Average -0,0077 -0,0151 -0,0118 -0,0047
Standard Deviation 0,1996 0,0944 0,1511 0,0871
Number Obs 147 178 325 164
Average -0,0012 0,0047 0,0014 0,0043
Standard Deviation 0,0879 0,0921 0,0896 0,0889
Number Obs 144 111 255 141
Average -0,0045 -0,0075 -0,0060 -0,0006
Standard Deviation 0,1545 0,0939 0,1279 0,0879


















Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure Excluding Financial Institutions – Greece, Spain and Portugal 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 1 
when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book total 
debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA divided 
by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20 and IBEX35, 
excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any relevant 
variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
-0,0841 -0,0191 -0,2128** 0,0123 0,0760
(1,9506) (0,0312) (0,0839) (0,1258) (0,3207)
-0,3239 0,0095 -0,0314 -0,1935** 0,0297 -0,1614
(1,4915) (0,0457) (0,0529) (0,0838) (0,0924) (0,6446)
0,0081 -0,0261
(0,0163) (0,0325)
-0,1851 -0,0127 -0,0976 0,0181 -0,0929
(0,3267) (0,0544) (0,0725) (0,0256) (0,3103)
-0,1000 -0,0818** 0,0119 -0,0822 0,0118 -0,0724
(0,2671) (0,0412) (0,0717) (0,0658) (0,0212) (0,2857)
0,0309 -0,0164
(0,0322) (0,0573)
-0,2306 -0,0218 -0,1831*** 0,0232 -0,0645
(0,2993) (0,0341) (0,0139) (0,0217) (0,3021)
-0,2100 -0,0405* -0,0141 -0,1967*** 0,0221 -0,0343
(0,2760) (0,0226) (0,0430) (0,0062) (0,0204) (0,3347)
0,0283 -0,0335
(0,0242) (0,0423)
0,3547 0,0453* -0,7104*** 0,0100 -0,7061***
(0,2470) (0,0247) (0,1461) (0,0188) (0,2151)
0,3996* 0,0917* 0,0000 -0,7542*** 0,0067 -0,4584**
(0,2154) (0,0205) (0,0448) (0,2557) (0,0140) (0,2306)
0,0277** -0,0127
(0,0110) (0,0196)
0,1991 0,0269 -0,2808 0,0032 -0,2967
(0,1747) (0,0328) (0,2224) (0,0112) (0,3657)
0,2041 0,0275 0,0246* -0,2802 0,0028 -0,2986
(0,2305) (0,0425) (0,0148) (0,2212) (0,0118) (0,3686)
0,0270* 0,0154
(0,0149) (0,0256)
0,2091 0,0189*** -3,4442*** 0,0060 -0,5140***
(0,1349) (0,0073) (0,0365) (0,0094) (0,0812)
0,3513*** 0,0497*** -0,0314 -0,4073*** -0,0027 -0,3160**
(0,1126) (0,0125) (0,0333) (0,1153) (0,0060) (0,1383)
0,0273*** -0,0016
(0,0097) (0,0179)
0,5616 -0,0230 -0,1304 -0,0324 0,5249**
(0,5631) (0,0204) (0,1837) (0,0401) (0,2174)
0,3914 -0,0003 -0,0307 -0,1660 -0,0205 0,4938**
(0,5097) (0,0198) (0,0199) (0,1482) (0,0352) (0,2062)
0,0319 0,0083
(0,0342) (0,0128)
0,7931*** -0,0258 -0,2490** -0,0367*** 0,0069
(0,2711) (0,0437) (0,1135) (0,0115) (0,4511)
0,7269*** -0,0155 -0,0357 -0,2039** -0,0355*** 0,1081
(0,2598) (0,0428) (0,0424) (0,1034) (0,0116) (0,3911)
0,0439 -0,0197
(0,0309) (0,0347)
0,5744** -0,0376 -0,1487* -0,0301* 0,3550
(0,2514) (0,0247) (0,0792) (0,0154) (0,2896)
0,5558** -0,0240 -0,0549* -0,1546** -0,0286* 0,3396













































Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure Excluding Financial Institutions – Italy, France and Germany 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 
1 when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book 
total debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA 
divided by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes FTSE MIB, CAC40 
and DAX, excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or where the value of any 
relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
0,9115** -0,0553 -0,1382 -0,0570** 0,5959
(0,4267) (0,1079) (0,1665) (0,0229) (0,4010)
1,0657** -0,1185 0,0063 -0,1519 -0,0654** 0,5492
(0,5078) (0,1676) (0,0596) (0,1166) (0,0298) (0,3884)
-0,0242 -0,0453
(0,0174) (0,0776)
0,0644 0,0335 -0,0990* -0,0014 0,0665
(0,1073) (0,0255) (0,0525) (0,0065) (0,1516)
0,0672 0,0204 0,0489 -0,0905** -0,0020 0,0941
(0,1077) (0,0246) (0,0344) (0,0456) (0,0064) (0,1576)
-0,0058 0,0354
(0,0192) (0,0245)
0,4727* -0,0093 -0,1977* -0,0235* 0,1081
(0,2532) (0,0434) (0,1129) (0,0137) (0,2102)
0,5024* -0,0352 0,0192 -0,1891** -0,0258* 0,1381
(0,2609) (0,0661) (0,0278) (0,0911) (0,0153) (0,2593)
-0,0148** 0,0045
(0,0071) (0,0265)
-0,1233 -0,0094 -0,1678*** 0,0135 -0,2255
(0,1572) (0,0176) (0,0593) (0,0099) (0,1430)
-0,1107 -0,0150 -0,0058 -0,1764*** 0,0131 -0,2380*
(0,1726) (0,0230) (0,0211) (0,0639) (0,0106) (0,1398)
-0,0056 -0,0161
(0,0122) (0,0173)
-0,0307 -0,0121 -0,0624 0,0049 -0,2371*
(0,0585) (0,0121) (0,0417) (0,0038) (0,1334)
-0,0336 -0,0170 -0,0065 -0,0659 0,0052 -0,2344*
(0,0638) (0,0152) (0,0121) (0,0437) (0,0041) (0,1404)
-0,0004 -0,0102
(0,0088) (0,0119)
-0,1221 -0,0034 -0,0866** 0,0101* -0,1451
(0,0877) (0,0105) (0,0391) (0,0054) (0,1125)
-0,1185 -0,0063 -0,0004 -0,0879** 0,0099* -0,1444
(0,0932) (0,0134) (0,0123) (0,0397) (0,0057) (0,1141)
-0,0073 -0,0079
(0,0072) (0,0104)
-0,2305 -0,0016 -0,1238** 0,0181* -0,0298
(0,1769) (0,0153) (0,0585) (0,0099) (0,1545)
-0,1840 0,0057 -0,0033 -0,0780 0,0130 -0,0369
(0,1544) (0,0240) (0,0154) (0,0476) (0,0083) (0,1706)
-0,0036 0,0012
(0,0156) (0,0151)
-0,4992*** -0,0223 -0,2059*** 0,0319*** 0,4594*
(0,1725) (0,0172) (0,0630) (0,0097) (0,2606)
-0,5011*** -0,0212 -0,0241 -0,2083*** 0,0321*** 0,4596*
(0,1745) (0,0180) (0,0237) (0,0634) (0,0098) (0,2630)
-0,0067 -0,0101
(0,0125) (0,0159)
-0,2482** -0,0093 -0,0947*** 0,0159** 0,1675
(0,1159) (0,0106) (0,0310) (0,0066) (0,1244)
-0,2551** -0,0114 -0,0077 -0,1031*** 0,0166** 0,1673











































Impact of a Plus or Minus Credit Rating on Capital Structure Excluding Financial Institutions – Full Sample 
Coefficients and standard errors from pooled time-series cross-section random-effects GLS regressions with robust errors of NetDIss on 
credit rating dummy variables and on the control variables leverage, size and profitability. NetDIss is net debt minus net equity divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets. The credit rating dummy variables are CRplus (equals 1 when a plus credit rating is observed), CRminus (equals 
1 when a minus credit rating is observed) and CRpom (equals 1 when either a plus or a minus credit rating is observed). Leverage is book 
total debt divided by book total debt plus book common equity. Size is given by the natural logarithm of total sales. Profitability is EBITDA 
divided by total assets (both from the previous year). The sample consists of firms from 1996 to 2011 from the indexes ATHEX20, PSI20, 
IBEX35, FTSE MIB, CAC40 and DAX, excluding financial institutions, firms with no S&P long-term domestic issuer credit rating in Reuters or 
where the value of any relevant variable (total debt, common equity, total assets, EBITDA and sales) is missing from Datastream. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Cons CRPOM CRMinus CRPlus Leverage Size Profitability Number of firm-years
0,1659 -0,0121 -0,1752*** -0,0045 -0,0212
(0,1061) (0,0148) (0,0478) (0,0057) (0,1126)
0,1612 -0,0105 -0,0129 -0,1714*** -0,0043 -0,0167
(0,1108) (0,0246) (0,0108) (0,0509) (0,0059) (0,1118)
-0,0007 -0,0123
(0,0076) (0,0133)
0,1529*** -0,0009 -0,0607** -0,0073** 0,0140
(0,0507) (0,0095) (0,0266) (0,0029) (0,0941)
0,1531*** -0,0036 0,0028 -0,0614** -0,0073** 0,0171
(0,0517) (0,0104) (0,0123) (0,0267) (0,0029) (0,0964)
0,0043 -0,0029
(0,0065) (0,0089)
0,1074* -0,0039 -0,0827** -0,0044 0,0509
(0,0595) (0,0070) (0,0335) (0,0032) (0,0747)
0,1076* -0,0043 -0,0035 -0,0828** -0,0044 0,0511
(0,0607) (0,0110) (0,0072) (0,0347) (0,0033) (0,0756)
-0,0006 -0,0054
(0,0046) (0,0066)
1 885
2 885
Full 
Sample
1996-2006
1 489
2 489
3 489
2007-2011
1
3 885
396
2 396
3 396
1996-2011
